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ABSTRACT
This research examines the the impact of modernity that has been reshaping Muslims’
lives in Muslim societies. It particularly examines various impacts of modernity such as
colonialism, secularism, liberalism, and Westernization that led Islamist to worry about
the decreasing role that Islam was playing in society and in the state. Their worry about
the absence of Islam in the public sphere led the Islamists to become the front line da’wa
group, intensively countering the impact of modernisation in the Islamic world. This re-
search employs qualitative approach combining observation and texts review. Reviewing
the relevant texts and observation to the contemporary da’wa movements and individuals
are conducted within both fieldwork and desk work. As the result, I argue that the Islam-
ists are the most ‘active’ Islamic da’wa movement in the modern societies including in
Indonesia. Activism is their core da’wa characteristics that routinely calls on Muslims to
respond to the impact of Western power. Their da’wa, therefore, is an activist ideology.
This research contributes to the contemporary da’wa discourses and movements in the
Muslim world.
Keywords: Da’wa, Islam, Modernization, Muslims, Western.
ABSTRAK
Penelitian ini mengkaji dampak modernitas yang telah ‘membentuk ulang’
kehidupan umat Islam ditengah masyarakat Muslim. Penelitian ini, secara khusus
meneliti berbagai dampak modernitas seperti kolonialisme, sekularisme,
liberalisme, dan westernisasi yang membuat kaum Islamis khawatir tentang
menurunnya peran yang dimainkan Islam ditengah masyarakat dan negara.
Kekhawatiran mereka tentang absennya Islam di ruang publik membuat kaum
Islamis menjadi kelompok garis depan dalam melakukan da’wa, yang secara
intensif melakukan counter terhadap dampak modernisasi di dunia Islam.
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Penelitian ini diuji melalui pendekatan kualitatif yang menggabungkan observasi
dengan ulasan terhadap teks-teks tertulis yang relevan. Melakukan kajian teks
dan pengamatan langsung terhadap gerakan da’wa kontemporer dan individu
dilakukan dengan cara fieldwork (kerja lapangan) dan desk work (kerja
kepustakaan). Sebagai hasil dari penelitian ini, saya berpendapat bahwa kaum
Islamis adalah gerakan da’wa Islam yang paling ‘aktif’ dalam masyarakat Muslim
modern termasuk di Indonesia. Aktivisme adalah karakteristik utama da’wa
mereka yang secara rutin menyerukan umat Islam untuk merespons dampak dari
kekuatan atau hegemoni Barat. Da’wa mereka, oleh karena itu, adalah memiliki
ideologi aktivis. Penelitian ini berkontribusi pada wacana dan gerakan da’wa
kontemporer di dunia Muslim.
Kata Kunci: Da’wa, Islam, Modernisasi, Muslim, Barat.
INTRODUCTION
Modernisation that have been taking place in Muslim countries since
the nineteenth century and earlier have changed the relationship between
Islam and the state. The reformulation of laws as a consequence of
modernisation, and the adoption of a largely Westernised legal system,
has had a profound impact on Islamic courts and the position of the
ulama. Modern, Western-influenced, ‘secular’ law has occupied a more
dominant position in these states, often replacing the role of Islamic law
with respect to matters of regulation and punishment.
The limiting of the role of such shari’ah related institutions in the colo-
nial and now the postcolonial public sphere, and the restriction of Islamic
authority in modern nation-states is perhaps the main way in which so-
called ‘Islamists’ – who struggle through various political means to re-
Islamise the public sphere - have encountered ‘the downfall of the hege-
mony of the symbolic Muslim system’.1 While many Islamists accommo-
dated themselves to the idea of the nation-state, at least in the sense that
it became the focus of their projects of Islamisation, secular Western ide-
ologies, from atheism to consumer capitalism, have been seen as the key
factor in undermining the normative Muslim systems of authority in the
modern world. Such key factors have been responded by the Islamists
through their da’wa movements.
This article outlines Islamism in Indonesian contexts that influenced by
Islamism in the Middle East, and highlighting particular gaps in the exist-
ing literature with regard to the Tarbiyah movement. Previous literatures
on this da’wa movement mostly studied the Tarbiyah movement in asso-
ciation with the increasingly formal and very public dakwah managed by
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the Prosperous and Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS). My re-
search maintained that this movement are also shaped by their members
in middle and lower levels of the movement which have strong roots in
informal networks (different with politics) that mainly emphasise the per-
sonal impact of a more private da’wa and embodied religious training in
strengthening their individual piety and sense of belonging amongst its
members. It is worth in my opinion, to study this movement through both
their individual da’wa and their public da’wa, and also to provide a clear
perspective on their position to modernity and how they respond through
their da’wa movements.
This article explains the significance of active da’wa within the Islam-
ists in the modern period. This article begins by explaining the impact of
modernity to the Muslim world, followed by examining the Islamists’ re-
sponse to the impact of globalised modernity, and then exploring the
Islamist notion of active da’wa.
THE IMPACT OF MODERNITY TO MUSLIM SOCIETY
From the sixteenth century through to the nineteenth, European soci-
ety gradually acquired and expanded its cultural, economic, and political
supremacy. This growth was marked by the rise of the natural sciences,
new technology which enabled industrial capitalism and new forms of
communication (such as the printing press), as well as a new political
stability. The structural transformations that Europe witnessed in these
areas is often collectively known as ‘modernity’.2
The modern period was also the period during which Muslim supremacy
declined as European economic and political strength increased. Thus the
European conquest of Muslim lands also occurred in this period, with
Britain, France, and the Netherlands having conquered and colonised
numerous Muslim countries by the end of eighteenth century.3 One by
one, the Ottoman caliphate’s territories were occupied, and the caliphate
itself – which was the only remaining symbol of Muslim political supremacy
– started to decline, with its final collapse occurring in 1924. The collapse
of the Ottoman caliphate – ‘the sick man of Europe’ - was widely taken as
the key symbol of Muslim political stagnation.
European colonisation pushed Muslims into an intense encounter with
modernity. Napoleon Bonaparte’s occupation of Egypt in 1799 not only
brought French troops armed with guns, but also modern science, ad-
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ministration, and technology. Later, Egypt was colonised by the British,
who built modern hospitals, schools, and scientific laboratories. Egypt’s
Muslim leaders and religious scholars were amazed by these European
modern scientific developments, and these encounters made them realise
how much Islamic countries had declined compared to European (non-
Muslim) countries. Within this period, then, Muslims came to acknowl-
edge the superiority of European society and the end of their own su-
premacy. They felt that the Europeans had left them too far behind in the
fields of modern education, economics, politics, and military power, and
this loss of power produced a deep psychological impact on Muslims.
Realising their ‘backwardness’, many Muslim leaders adopted moder-
nity, particularly within the arena of politics. They built freedom move-
ments which aspired to indigenous modern nation-states, often leaving
the idea of the caliphate and other traditional Islamic political systems
behind. Nation-state building began after World War I, and during this
period, Muslim elites in countries such as Turkey, Egypt and Indonesia
endeavoured to establish modern political and social systems. These
modernisation programmes transformed the structures of political sys-
tems in Muslim societies, with Turkey, under the leadership of Mustafa
Kemal Attaturk, becoming the first Muslim country to reject the Islamic
caliphate and become a modern, secular state. For Attaturk, to develop
the state required Turkey to become westernised and Islam largely
privatised, and such thinking led to similar modifications soon following
in other Muslim states.
This ‘modernisation’ agenda challenged many Muslims’ convictions,
particularly those who disagreed with the marginalisation of Islamic sys-
tems. In the face of such challenges, many Muslims felt it necessary to
defend Islam and to object to the adoption of secular concepts such as
rationalism, parliamentary institutions, and the replacement of Islamic law
with European law. Many regarded this reform as being incompatible
with Islamic principles requiring Muslims to use shari’ah as the central
source of Muslim social life, and saw it as removing Islam from Muslims’
public lives.
As a result, heated debate emerged during the nineteenth and twen-
tieth Centuries among Muslims, concerning how best to respond to mo-
dernity. Many scholars including Wiktorowicz (2006), Rippin (2005), Roy
(2004), and Kurzman (2002) have come up with different but related
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typologies to classify Muslim responses to modernity.4 There are three
basic types of Muslim response to modernity as suggested by these schol-
ars – the traditionalist; the modernist (and to some extent related to secu-
larist position); and the Islamist. As Rippin (2005) points out, typologies
are theoretical categories that can help to identify tendencies, but social
realities can rarely be fitted neatly into one position or another. In this
article, I will examine only the most relevant typology to this topic; the
Islamists.
ISLAMISTS’ RESPONSES TO MODERNITY
The absence of Islamic values in public spheres, Islamic states, and
Muslim rulers are the main concerns of the Islamists. As a result of the
impact of modernisation and secularisation brought by colonialism, the
role of traditional ulama and religious scholars in conducting da’wa had
changed in the modern period. With the developments of new media,
the printing press and information technologies, Muslims became exposed
to new religious discourses from ulama old and new, as well as modern-
ists and Islamists. Modernists and Islamists challenged and criticised the
traditionalists’ approach to da’wa through their dakwah movements.
Modern Islamists strongly believe in the need for Muslims to be active in
Islamising the public sphere and the state. In the twentieth century, Islam-
ist movements came to represent ideological opposition to the influence
of other Western ‘isms’, such as liberalism, Zionism, and secularism.5 For
them, the “cultural imperialism” and the increasing global hegemony of
Western culture, economic and politics have shifted Islamic values of
Muslims.
 In responding to the impact of modernity, the Islamists rejected the
ideas of both traditionalists and modernists or secularists.6 The Islamists is
characterised by its key ideology that ‘Islam(ism) is the solution’ (Al-Islamu
huwa al-hall). In this regard, Islam is not only seen as a religion, but also
as a political ideology. It is should reformulate all aspects of society, in-
cluding politics, economics, social life, the law, and so forth,7 with Islam-
ists emphasising the absolute character of the source of authority of Is-
lam; Quran and Sunna.
In contrast with traditionalists, modernists and secularists, Islamists
tend to accept changes in a ‘controlled’ fashion.8 They accept more re-
stricted changes than modernists, and use the two authoritative sources
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of the Quran and the Sunna to accept or legitimate changes in the mod-
ern era. Islamists have often responded to modernisation in a complex
fashion by rejecting Westernisation but rooting certain aspects of moder-
nity in the ‘pure’ Islam of the Quran and Sunna. Thus, Islamists have
‘indigenised and Islamised’ many concepts and structures from Western
political sciences, including ideology, revolution, organisation, democracy,
and political parties.9
Islamists use political actions to attempt to re-create a ‘true’ and ‘pure’
Islamic society utilising shari’ah (Islamic law) to govern the state as well as
public life. Most Islamists have sought to establish political parties and
have participated in democratic procedures such as general elections whilst
trying to show that Islam represents the best form of ‘democracy’.10 Is-
lamists have claimed that shura (consultation), as mentioned in the Qur’an
and practiced by the Prophet Muhammad, is a principle of democracy in
Islam, but have accepted democracy per se in order to support their goal
of establishing an Islamic society.
The Islamists ideology was in many ways inspired and influenced by
pre-modern revivalist figures like Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328 CE) and
Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1787 CE). As revivalists, such fig-
ures attributed the political decline of Muslims to the increasing hetero-
doxy of the everyday practice of Islam. Revivalists believe that if Muslims
return to ‘pure’ Islam as found in the Qur’an and Sunna, they will be able
to restore the ‘glory’ of the past. Hence, the ideology of Islamism is re-
lated to revivalism and related complex and criss-crossing orientations in
terms of a basic emphasis on seeking to purify and revitalize Islam.11
Islamists are also to some extent influenced and inspired by the re-
formist ideas of Egyptian scholars such as Jamaluddin al-Afghani (1838-
1897 CE), Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905 CE), and Rashid Ridha (1865-
1935 CE) who are considered amongst the most influential modernist
figures.12 However, Islamism’s reformist ideas have a complex relationship
to such modernist figures. The modernists’ reformist ideas generally at-
tempted to reinterpret Islam in such a way so as to support modernity,
while the Islamists came to focus more on Islamising modernity. Richard
Mitchell, writing of the first mass Islamist movement, the Muslim Brother-
hood (MB), which was founded in 1920s Egypt, explains: “the Islamist
movements aimed at a total reform of the political, economic, and social
life of the country”.13 Thus a general characteristic of Islamism is the belief
193Vol. 15 No. 2 Desember 2019
that Islamic teachings should encompass all aspects of life, from the pri-
vate to the public domain.
Scholars such as Rippin (2005), Roy (2004) and Nasr (1996) consider
Abul A’la Mawdudi (1903–1979), Hasan al-Banna (1906–1949) and Sayyid
Qutb (1906–1966) to be amongst the earliest Islamist ideologues. They
are founding fathers and intellectuals of Islamist dakwah movements,
namely the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (established in 1928) and the
Jamaat-i Islami (JI) in Pakistan (established in 1941). Their da’wa emphasises
the promotion of Islamic teachings and the provision of information on
Islam for both Muslims and non-Muslims.14 Through these dakwah
organisations, the afore-mentioned Islamist figures advocated a more ‘au-
thentic’ Islamic framework for Muslim society. Also, whilst Mawdudi and
al-Banna believed that the use of persuasion and gradual changes was
best suited for achieving Islamic goals, Qutb believed in the need for more
radical change.
These three Islamists figures had a significant impact on Muslims world-
wide, especially young educated Muslims in urban areas with secular edu-
cational backgrounds.15 The Muslim Brotherhood attracted Muslims in
the Middle East especially, and some of their branches became prominent
parties in the Sudan, Palestine and Tunisia. By contrast, the JI became
more prevalent among South Asian Muslims, and their immigrant and
diaspora communities in Pakistan, India, East Africa, the UK, and the Car-
ibbean.16 However, the Muslim Brotherhood also attracted Muslims in
Indonesia, and became the inspiration for an Islamist dakwah party, whilst
the influence of the JI is not prevalent among Indonesian Muslims. In-
deed, movements in the Middle East such as the Muslim Brotherhood or
al-Ikhwan al Muslimun, have had a strong global influence on Islamist
movements worldwide, including in Indonesia. This movement influenced
the Tarbiyah movement conceptually and ideologically (Machmudi, 2016;
Permata, 2013). The Tarbiyah movement designed their da’wa programs/
activities and goals based on the gradual Islamisation of the MB (individu-
family-society and state).
THE ISLAMIST NOTION OF ‘ACTIVE’ DA’WA
As the modernisation brought a shift in Islamic worlds in terms of
culture, social life, economics, and politics, including the marginalisation
of the shari’ah court, the ulama’s role in society, and traditional Islamic
194 AFKARUNA
schools, the Islamists da’wa have been very active especially in countering
Western culture, politics, and economics.17 They regarded western cul-
ture, economics, and politics as reflecting ‘Western’ values, which are
characterised as ‘atheistic’, secular, and anti-religion.18 Islamist da’wa
movements see Islam as a comprehensive and active ideology whose role
is not only to transform their selves but also their society (especially poli-
tics, cultures and economics).
These movements, thus propagate da’wa messages, not only focusing
on private da’wa or seeking to Islamise individuals, but also focusing on
public da’wa with the aim of Islamising the society and the state.19. The
focus of da’wa, for them, should go beyond the level of the individual,
and be instrumental in creating an Islamic society, either through estab-
lishing Islamic political parties or producing impacts on the social and
spiritual aspects of society through some other media or ‘counter pub-
lic’.20 In transforming their societies, these movements developed a vari-
ety of da’wa models, including religious edification, religious education
or training, and Islamic charity or social activity, building educational cen-
tres, religious places, and social and public services such as hospitals and
clinics to support their da’wa agenda. They also travelled to many coun-
tries around the world to promote their da’wa ideology and, as a result,
transnational da’wa activities and da’wa organisations have been estab-
lished in many parts of the Muslim world.21 These organisations have
adopted various new forms of da’wa, with new aims based on their reli-
gious interpretations, their responses to public issues, and their involve-
ment in social and political activities.
The core message of their da’wa is that Islam should be strongly present
not only in the private sphere, but in the public sphere as well. For the
modern Islamists, then, it is not enough simply to be a good Muslim just
in the personal or private sphere; Muslims also need to actively shape the
society or state they live in by seeking to make it more Islamic. Thus,
Islamist movements focus on both disciplining the self for improving indi-
vidual piety and controlling public piety.22 For the Islamists, strengthening
individual piety is a Muslim obligation which aims to reject Western or
modernisation influences to their religious valus.
In my previous study (2019), I explained that ‘Individual piety’ means
the commitment to perform obligatory rituals such as the five-times-daily-
prayers, reciting the Qur’an, fasting in the month of Ramadan, giving
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alms, and dressing and behaving in an ‘Islamic’ way. While ‘public piety’
means particular behaviour or practice performed in the public sphere
that comes to have political significance. The concept of public piety also
implies that there may be attempts at the regulation and standardisation
of practices that are regarded by particular constituencies as appropri-
ately ‘pious’.
Key Islamist figures such as Hasan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, and Abul
A’la Mawdudi have greatly influenced contemporary Islamist da’wa move-
ments by strengthening their focus on locating Islamic identity within the
public sphere and critiquing modernity. They also exemplify more ‘gradu-
alist’ (al-Banna and Mawdudi) and more ‘radical’/‘revolutionary’ (Qutb)
forms of Islamism. Al-Banna, the founder of the MB, was deeply con-
cerned about the impact of Westernisation on the Islamic beliefs and prac-
tices of Egyptian Muslims, perceiving Western culture and thought to have
had a significant influence on Muslims in Egypt. He regarded this influ-
ence as a cause of the moral and political decline of Muslims, and created
a new model of da’wa that called on Muslims to perform Islamic teach-
ings in their daily life to address this, ranging from issues regarding do-
mestic affairs to public matters.
For al-Banna, Islam needed to provide the key guidance for Muslim
societies, and his influence is clear in the MB’s political views that Islam:
1) is a comprehensive, self-evolving system providing the ultimate path to
life; 2) emanates from, and is based on, two fundamental sources – the
Qur’an and the Sunna; and 3) is applicable at all times and places.23 How-
ever, although he, like other Islamists, promoted the establishment of a
better Islamic state, he did not propose violence as a means for achieving
this da’wa goal. Like al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb (born in 1906 in Asyut-Egypt),
also criticised modern cultures and thoughts.24 These criticisms are mostly
presented in his books, al-Adala al-Ijtima’iyya fi al-Islam (Social Justice in
Islam) which was written in 1949 and Ma’alim fi al-Tariq (Milestones) which
was first published in 1964. The first book explains that the separation of
religion and politics is a characteristic of Western societies and thus would
be inappropriate for Islamic societies. The second book deals with the key
concept of jahiliyya (ignorance). According to Qutb, although current
Muslim societies proclaim themselves to be Muslim, they do not practice
worship (ibadah), and they erroneously believe in sovereignty (hakimiyya)
other than God. For Qutb, Muslims in these societies are also living in
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jahiliyya. 25
According to Qutb, any society that is not Muslim is an instance of
jahiliyya, and everything outside Islam must also be included in the cat-
egory of Jahiliyya as it is derived from the spirit of barbarism and is con-
trary to Islamic teachings.26 For Qutb, although contemporary Muslim
governments remain, they can be categorised as ‘infidel’ governments
when they do not implement shari’ah. Muslim rulers, as they existed in
the history of Islam are, therefore, not enough for Qutb and his followers:
Muslim rulers must have a commitment to implementing shari’ah and
Islamic values in their countries. A Muslim society, according to Qutb,
must apply Islam across the board, letting it guide their faith, worship,
legislation, social organisations and modes of behaviour.
As a result of these views, Qutb, unlike al-Banna, stated that Muslims
are allowed to fight against such ‘infidel’ governments. Qutb therefore
promoted a new model of da’wa that emphasised the need for activism
and political jihad in order to turn Islam into a global power.27 This shows
Qutb’s goal of making Islam the basis of a state – an orientation that
demands a total human submission to God.28 Qutb thus rejected democ-
racy, rationalism and secularism, and held that Islam needed to be puri-
fied from Western influences. Soage (2009: 189) highlights that Qutb’s
perception on “the corrupt parliamentary democracy of pre-revolutionary
Egypt has led him to turn to Islam as the solution of all problems”.29 For
instance, he rejected the Western banking system, which he considered
to be contrary to Islamic law. He also criticised Western behaviour, in par-
ticular that associated with a concern for material goods.30 Likewise, he
rejected Western ideas about separating religious from secular matters,
and the West’s adherence to rationalism. He thus refused to reconcile
Islamic teachings with European outlooks, viewing Islam as a comprehen-
sive ideology that regulates all aspects of human life.31
Giles Kepel (2005), who studied Islamic radical movements in Egypt,
found that many contemporary radical Islamist activists are influenced by
Qutb’s ideas and, like Kepel, Rippin (2005) classified Qutb and other
Muslims who oppose their governments as ‘radical’ Islamists. Qutb was
also considered to be responsible for the shift in the outlook of at least
some of the MB’s members from holding moderate views under al-Banna’s
leadership to becoming a radical splinter movement. His concept of Jahiliyya
marks an obvious fission in the MB’s ideology, as al-Banna never accused
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the Egyptian regime of his day of being non-Islamic.32
Appealing to such an understanding of sovereignty, Mawdudi argued
that political sovereignty also belongs to God alone. If there are human
agents that seek to constitute the sovereignty of God through implement-
ing the political system of Islam in a state, they will never succeed because
of the limitations of their power.33 A democratic caliphate, for Mawdudi,
means that the government is the only institution that is responsible for
establishing shari’ah. The Islamic caliphate is certainly not a ‘theocratic’
system. It is the antithesis of monarchy, and fundamentally different from
the Western democratic system, which is based on the sovereignty of the
people, whereas the caliphate system is tied to the sovereignty of God.
Mawdudi was another key Islamist figure. He was regarded as an Is-
lamist because of his beliefs about God’s unique sovereignty, the univer-
sal application and implementation of shari’ah, and the need for a demo-
cratic caliphate.34 According to Mawdudi, sovereignty over any aspect of
life is only for God, since God is the creator and the ruler of the universe.35
He criticised the concept of democracy because he believed that it mis-
lead people about the true concept of sovereignty.36 Furthermore, gov-
ernments that are elected by people should consider their position as be-
ing amanah (in trust) from God. Therefore, they have to implement God’s
commands – shari’ah – in the state and in all Muslim society.
The ideas of criticising ‘Western’ modernity and emphasising Islamic
identity are most attractive to urban, lower middle class Muslims,37 who
believe that modernisation programmes in Muslim countries cannot suc-
ceed in transforming these societies into prosperous ones. For them, reli-
gious authenticity is the key for this transformation, and this is one of the
central factors that generates their interest in the ‘alternative’ to the state
system offered by Islamists. Their da’wa, as an activist ideology, therefore
represents a new or reinvented approach.
As an Islamist movement, the Tarbiyah Movement that established of-
ficially in early 1980s in Indonesia has had an impact on the development
of contemporary da’wa movements in the country, attracting large num-
bers of young Muslims. The Tarbiyah movement in this country have simi-
lar concerns and ideologies regarding the Islamisation of society and the
public sphere with other contemporary Islamist movements worldwide.
They are very active in conducting their da’wa agenda and promoting
their da’wa messages online. They actively attend the weekly Liqo (reli-
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gious training) sessions in their closest neighborhood and other da’wa
activities.38 They also use social media platforms for spreading their da’wa
perspectives online. As been highlighted by Mandaville (2007) and
Eickelman and Anderson (2003), this is not surprising, given that the Is-
lamists have been the quickest in using almost all forms of modern tech-
nology, including the printing press, social media, and the internet. They
conduct da’wa in public sphere that is more active and powerful form of
da’wa, especially nowadays through the use of modern technology; so-
cial media and internet, such as Whatsapp, Facebook, Twitter and
Instagram.
CONCLUSION
The debate concerning Islam and modernity indicates that there is a
range of ways in which Muslims have dealt with modernity. They differ in
approaches regarding the extent to which modernity and its transforma-
tions should be accommodated. Most Muslims realise that Islam has been
declining – in politics, economics, the military, and sciences – and for the
Islamists, this decline has been caused by Muslims breaking with Islamic
values, identities and traditions. They view most Muslims as failing to
practice the ‘true’ Islam revealed to the Prophet Muhammad, and con-
tend that the best way to solve this problem is to return to living by the
Qur’an and Sunna.
Islamist da’wa movements have played an important role in respond-
ing to the absence of Islam from public life that colonialism and secular-
ism led to in Muslim countries. The Islamist da’wa ideology concerning
the strengthening of Islamic identity and the piety of Muslims, together
with the creation of a more Islamic form of society, have attracted young
people from the urban lower and middle classes. These young urban
Muslims perceive this ideology as representing a revision of Islam that is
more responsive to the modern period, and that provides a ‘better mo-
dernity’ – one that is more Islamic, religious, spiritual, just and humane.
Islamist da’wa groups are regarded as the most prominent adherents
of da’wa in modern period. I found that both private da’wa (which con-
cerns the Islamisation of the self to create pious individuals) and public
da’wa (which concerns the Islamisation of society to create a pious soci-
ety), have different meanings and orientations for contemporary Islamist
movements. This finding contributes to the current scholarship and fu-
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ture study on Islamist da’wa movements regarding that modern Islamists
having a stronger commitment to da’wa than was the case historically,
believe it necessary to be especially active (and even sometimes aggres-
sive) in preaching and Islamising both the private and public domains,
not only within individual level but also within society and state level.
Their focus on public da’wa has resulted in large part from the disap-
pointment that Islamists have confronted regarding the relative absence
of shari’ah (together with the lack of religious values) within the public
sphere in the modern period. Modern Islamists strongly believe in the
need for Muslims to be active in Islamising the public sphere and the
state.
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